What "recovery" actually means in the first hour
If you're reading this because something is encrypted right now, do these in order.
Pull the network cable or turn off Wi-Fi on affected machines. Don't power them off unless you have to, because memory can hold evidence. Isolate, don't wipe.
Then call someone. Your insurance carrier's breach hotline comes first if you have a cyber policy, because many policies only cover vendors they approve. After that, call an incident response firm or your managed IT provider.
Do not start reinstalling Windows. That feels productive, and it destroys the evidence you need to learn how the attackers got in.
Know your downtime number before you need it
Here's a rough way to price an outage. Add your daily revenue to your daily payroll for people who can't work, then divide by the hours you're open. A 25-person office in Fishers with $15,000 in daily revenue and $6,000 in idle payroll loses roughly $2,600 an hour over an eight-hour day.
That's a rule of thumb, not a precise figure. It's still enough to make decisions with.
A typical small-business recovery runs from several days to a few weeks, depending on how clean your backups are. If you have tested, isolated backups, you can often restore core systems in 1 to 3 days. If you don't, the timeline is whatever the attackers and your forensic team allow.
Backups: the only part you control in advance
The old 3-2-1 rule still holds: three copies of your data, on two kinds of storage, with one copy offsite. Add one more word to it: immutable. An immutable backup can't be altered or deleted for a set period, even by an administrator account. Ransomware crews look for your backup server first and delete it before they encrypt anything else.
My pick is immutable cloud backup with a retention window of 30 to 90 days. I wouldn't bother with a USB drive that sits plugged into a server. It gets encrypted along with everything else. I'd also skip tape for a small business. It works, but the restore process is slow, and most offices don't practice it.
What does it cost? For a small office with 1 to 5 terabytes, immutable cloud backup commonly runs somewhere between $100 and $500 a month, depending on the vendor and how many servers you protect. That's a rule of thumb. Get three quotes. Against a $2,600-an-hour outage, it pays for itself in the first hour you don't lose.
Test the restore, or it isn't a backup
A backup you've never restored is a hope.
Test quarterly at minimum. Once a month is better for anything that runs the business, like your accounting system, line-of-business database, or patient records. Pick a random file, a random server, and one full system. Time it. Write the time down.
That last number matters most. If your plan says you'll be back in four hours and the test takes thirty, you've learned something cheaply.
Don't pay, in most cases
I wouldn't pay, and I'd tell most small businesses the same. The FBI advises against paying, and the reasoning is practical. Payment doesn't guarantee you get a working decryptor. It marks you as a business that pays, and it funds the next attack.
There are real exceptions. If lives are at risk or the business will fail without the data, owners sometimes decide otherwise, and that decision belongs to them, with counsel and the insurer in the room. But treat payment as the last option on the list.
Also, think twice before downloading random "free decryptors" from search results. Some are malware. If you want to check whether a free decryption tool exists for your strain, start with the No More Ransom project (nomoreransom.org), which is run by law enforcement and security vendors.
Who to call and report to
Report the attack. You aren't required to in every case, but it helps, and some situations do require it.
- FBI: File a report at ic3.gov. The FBI's Indianapolis field office covers central Indiana, including Hamilton County.
- CISA: The agency's StopRansomware pages offer guidance and a reporting channel.
- Your attorney: Call before you send any notification, so the wording is right.
- Your insurer: Do it early. Late notice can jeopardize a claim.
If you hold personal information about Indiana residents, state breach notification rules may apply. Indiana's law is in Indiana Code 24-4.9, and it involves notifying affected people and the Attorney General's office. If you handle health data, HIPAA's breach rules add a separate clock, with notification generally due within 60 days of discovery. Have a lawyer confirm what applies to you. I'm describing the landscape, not giving legal advice.
Rebuilding without reinfecting
This is where recoveries go wrong. A business restores from backup, comes back online, and gets hit again within days because the attacker's way in is still open.
Before you reconnect anything:
- Find the entry point. It's often an exposed remote desktop port, a stolen password with no multifactor authentication, or an unpatched VPN appliance.
- Reset every credential. That means all admin accounts, service accounts, and anything stored in a browser on an infected machine. Reset the Kerberos account in Active Directory twice if you run it. Your IT team will know what that means.
- Rebuild, don't clean. Wipe affected machines and reinstall. Cleaning an infected machine is a gamble.
- Restore from a point before the intrusion. Attackers often sit in a network for days before they encrypt. If your backup is from the night before, it may already contain their tools.
The cheap fixes that prevent most of this
Turn on multifactor authentication for email, VPN, and every admin account. Of everything in this article, that's the one I'd do today. It's free or nearly free, and it blocks a large share of the stolen-password break-ins.
Patch internet-facing systems within about 14 days, and faster for anything flagged as actively exploited. CISA keeps a public Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list worth checking against your gear.
Close remote desktop to the open internet. If someone needs remote access, put it behind a VPN with MFA.
Endpoint detection and response software, the kind that watches for behavior rather than known viruses, typically runs about $5 to $12 per device per month. I'd choose that over a traditional antivirus subscription. Basic antivirus misses too much.
Write the plan down on paper
Your plan is useless if it lives on the server that just got encrypted. Print it. Keep a copy offsite or in a personal cloud account that isn't tied to your company login.
It should fit on two pages:
- Phone numbers for your IT provider, insurer, attorney, and bank
- A list of your five most important systems and the order you'll restore them
- Who makes decisions, and who talks to employees and customers
- Where the backups are and who has the credentials
Run a tabletop exercise once a year. Gather the owners and the IT lead for an hour, hand them a scenario ("it's Monday at 7 a.m. and every file ends in .locked"), and see what breaks in the conversation. It costs nothing but the hour.
The short version
Isolate first. Call your insurer and a response team second. Don't pay by reflex. Rebuild rather than clean.
And spend this month on the boring work: immutable backups, a tested restore, and MFA everywhere. That's the difference between a bad week and a closed business.