How immutable backups protect your business from ransomware

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By Markus Winkelhock

The short answer

Backups that an attacker can't delete. Everything else helps, but this is the one control that turns a catastrophe into a bad week.

Ransomware works because it takes away your access to your own files and then charges you to get it back. If you can restore everything from a clean copy, the attacker has little left to sell you. They may still threaten to leak stolen data, which is a separate problem, but you won't be locked out of your business.

Build backups the attacker can't reach

Most modern ransomware crews hunt for your backups before they encrypt anything. They look for backup servers, network shares, and cloud accounts that a stolen admin login can reach. A backup sitting on a drive permanently mounted to your file server is just another file share to them.

The old 3-2-1 rule still holds up: three copies of your data, on two kinds of storage, with one copy offsite. Add one more requirement for today: at least one copy must be immutable or offline.

Immutable means the storage refuses to delete or change the data for a set period, even if someone has valid admin credentials. Amazon S3 Object Lock and Backblaze B2 Object Lock both offer this. Many backup products, such as Veeam and Acronis, can write to those targets. An offline option works too: a rotated external drive that's unplugged after the job finishes.

Some rules of thumb for settings:

  • Frequency: daily for ordinary file servers and laptops. Hourly, or continuous, for databases and anything that changes all day.
  • Retention: keep 30 to 90 days of restore points. Ransomware sometimes sits quietly for weeks, and you need a copy from before it arrived.
  • Cost: cloud object storage runs roughly $5 to $15 per terabyte per month. That's a rule of thumb, and prices change, so check current rates. A small office with 2 TB of data can have immutable offsite backups for well under $30 a month.

That's cheap insurance.

Patch the doors attackers actually use

Attackers rarely do anything clever to get in. They use unpatched internet-facing systems, exposed remote desktop, and stolen passwords.

Remote Desktop Protocol open to the internet is the classic mistake. If port 3389 is reachable from anywhere, close it today. Put remote access behind a VPN or a zero-trust access tool, and require multifactor authentication on it.

For patching, a workable target is 14 days for critical vulnerabilities on anything facing the internet (firewalls, VPN appliances, mail servers) and 30 days for everything else. That's a sensible rule of thumb, not a law. If a vulnerability is being actively exploited, move faster. CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is a free, public list of exactly those flaws, and checking it monthly takes ten minutes.

Edge devices deserve special attention. Firewalls and VPN gateways get attacked constantly, and they often sit unpatched for months because nobody owns them.

Stop one stolen password from becoming a disaster

Phishing emails and reused passwords still hand over the keys more often than any exotic exploit.

Turn on multifactor authentication for email, remote access, your backup console, and every admin account. Start there, in that order.

If you can afford it, use hardware security keys for administrators. They cost about $25 to $60 each, and you want two per person, one as a spare. Keys resist phishing in a way that text-message codes don't, because a fake login page can't relay them. For everyone else, an authenticator app is fine and a big step up from SMS codes.

Give admins two accounts: one for daily email and browsing, one for administration. A phished daily account then can't wipe your servers.

Add endpoint detection, and let someone watch it

Traditional antivirus matches known malware. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) watches behavior, like a process rapidly renaming thousands of files or disabling security tools, and can isolate the machine before encryption spreads.

For a small business, EDR typically costs somewhere around $3 to $8 per device per month, though quotes vary a lot by vendor and size. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike, and SentinelOne are the usual names.

Here's my opinion: EDR without someone reading the alerts is a smoke detector with the battery out. If you don't have staff who'll respond at 2 a.m., pay for a managed detection service that does. It usually costs more than the software itself and is worth it.

Limit how far an infection can spread

Assume one laptop will eventually get infected. The question is how much it can reach.

  • Remove local admin rights from regular users. Most people never need them.
  • Give each person access only to the shares they actually use.
  • Separate your backup systems from your main network, with their own credentials that aren't tied to your regular directory login.
  • Segment the network so workstations can't talk directly to each other or to servers they have no business reaching.

None of this is glamorous. It's also what separates one encrypted laptop from an encrypted company.

Test the restore

A backup you've never restored is a hope, not a backup.

Once a quarter, restore a real set of files, then a whole server if you can, and time it. Write down how long it took. If restoring 2 TB takes three days over your internet connection, you want to know that now, not mid-incident. Some businesses find they need a local copy as well as a cloud one, purely for speed.

Also write a one-page response plan: who to call, who can shut down the network, where the backup credentials are stored (on paper or in a separate vault, not on the server that's burning). Check that your cyber insurer's required contacts are on it.

What I wouldn't bother with

Paying the ransom as a plan. It's not a strategy. Payment doesn't guarantee working decryption tools, and it doesn't guarantee your data won't be sold or leaked anyway. Treat it as a last resort that your lawyers and insurer weigh in on, never as something you budget for.

I'd also skip standalone "anti-ransomware" add-ons layered over a decent EDR product. They usually duplicate what you already have and add alerts nobody reads.

And don't treat cyber insurance as protection. It can help pay for recovery, but insurers increasingly require MFA, EDR, and tested backups before they'll even write a policy. It rewards the controls above. It doesn't replace them.

A sensible order of work

If you're starting from almost nothing, here's the order I'd follow:

  1. This week: Set up immutable or offline backups and turn on MFA for email and admin accounts.
  2. This month: Close exposed remote desktop, patch internet-facing devices, and remove unneeded admin rights.
  3. This quarter: Deploy EDR with someone monitoring it, test a full restore, and write the response plan.

A small business can do all of this for somewhere between a few hundred and a few thousand dollars a year, depending on headcount and data volume. That's a rough range, not a quote. Compare it with a week of lost work and a recovery bill, and the math gets easy.

Start with the backups. Then work down the list.

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